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COURT OF APPFAI 9 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF STATE OF UTAH ^ ^ 
Gilbert Loret to , Supplemental Memorandum 
Pet i t ioner /appel lant of Points and Authorit ies in 
Support of Petit ion for Writ 
of Extraordinary Relief 
v, (Habeas Corpus R.65(C) Utah 
R.C.P.) 
Warden Hank Galetka Case no. 98183 l-Sc:Ct. Of 
State of Utah et. al. App. 9818310 CA 
Comes Now, Gilbert Loretto Pro Se, and respectfully submits 
this supplemental Memorandum of points and authorit ies in support 
of his pet i t ion for Writ of Habeas Corpus. This peti t ion is in 
accordance with established law and should be granted for the 
following reasons, 
GROUNDS FOR RELIEF 
Under section 78-35a-104(1) unless precluded by section 78-
35a-106 or 78-35a-107, U,C.A. a person who has been convicted and 
sentenced for a criminal offense may file an action in the district 
court of original jur isdic t ion for post-conviction relief to vacate or 
modify the conviction or sentence upon the following grounds. ( It 
should be noted Mr. Loretto has met and complied with the 
requirements l isted, supra) . 
(a) The conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed in 
violation of the United States Constitution or the Utah State 
Const i tut ion, ( Mr. Loret to 's rights were disregarded). . . 
(c) The sentence was imposed in an unlawful manner.. . The 
arguments contained in this brief are demonstrative of overt 
denial of Lore t to ' s consti tutionally guaranteed protections. 
(d) The pet i t ioner ( i .e . Loretto) had ineffective assistance of 
counsel in violat ion of the United States Constitution or the 
Utah States Consti tution ; the arguments listed, infra indicate 
this is an accurate assessment of what transpired in Mr. 
Lore t to ' s matter. 
Under section 78-35a-106 [there] exists [a] Preclusion of 
Relief-exception which is consistent with Mr. Loret to ' s current 
peti t ion for extraordinary relief. 
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon 
any ground that . . . 
(c) Could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal. 
(2) Not with standing subsection (1) (c), a person may be 
el igible for rel ief on basis that the ground could have been but was 
not raised at trial or on appeal, if failure to raise the ground was due 
to ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr. Lore t to ' s position is that 
his rights have been violated as he was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel at trial and upon direct appeal. 
The const i tut ional ly guaranteed right of counsel encompasses 
the right of effective assistance of counsel both at trial and [upon] 
the first direct appeal of right. Evitts v. LuceyT 469 U.S.387,105 S. 
ct. 830, 83 L. Ed. 2d. 821(1985); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668,685,104 S. ct. 2052, 2063, 80 L. Ed. 674(1984). In State v. 
Dunn. 791 P.2d 873 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court referred to 
Robinson v. Black . 812 F.2d 1084 (8TH Cir. 1 987), the court in 
Robinson stated: 
"Counsel did not act as an advocate for Robinson when he 
briefed all issues in favor of the government and concluded 
that Robinson 's claims were merit less. Robinson had a right 
to expect counsel to brief and argue his case to the best of 
counsel ' s abi l i ty , showing the most favorable side of the defendant 's 
arguments. Counsel changed the adversarial 
process into an inquisitorial one by joining the forces 
of the state and working against his cl ient ." 
Section 12 F.2d. At 1086-87. See also DeMorrias v. United States . 
444 F.2d. 162.(8TH Cir .1971); Smith v. United States. 3 84 F.2d. 649 
3 
. ( 8 T H Cir.1 967V Dunn at 877. Mr. Loretto rightfully contends his 
counsel provided Consti tut ionally deficient representation which is 
proven by his own pro se arguments which are contained in this brief. 
In Dunn, the discussion was about an Anders brief which the Utah 
Supreme Court stated "should have included and addressed the issues 
that Dunn raised in his pro se brief. Like wise, Mr, Loretto should be 
granted the same type of deference. To be effective, attorney must 
play role of an advocate, rather then a mere friend of [the] court. 
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 6. State v. Holland. 921 P. 2d. 430 (Utah 
1996). Unless an attorney represents the interests of a client with 
zeal and loyalty, the adversarial system of jus t ice cannot operate. 
Holland II, 876 P. 2d. At 359 (citing United States v. Cronic. 466 
U.S. 648 ,656-57 , 104 S. Ct .2039,2045-46 , 
80L. Ed. 2d. 657(1984); Van Moltke v. Gil l ies . 332 U.S. 708, 725-26, 
68 S. Ct. 316, 324, 90L.Ed.309(1948) (plurali ty opinion). 
In ineffective assistance claims alleging a deficiency in 
attorney performance a defendant must affirmatively prove 
prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S. Ct. at 
2067; see also United States v. Cronic. 466 U.S. 648, 659, and n.24, 
104 S. Ct. 2039, 2047n.24, 80L.Ed.2d. 657(1984). However in Sixth 
4 
Amendment claims based on actual denial of counsel, constructive 
denials of counsel , or conflicts of interest , prejudice is presumed. 
Strickland (quoting) State v. Templin, 805 P.2d. 1 82(Utahl 990). 
(Emphasis added) If an a t torney 's loyalty is compromised because he 
believes that his client should be convicted or because he (she) is 
influenced by a conflict in loyalties to other defendants, third 
par t ies , or the government, the law cannot tolerate the risk that the 
attorney will fail to subject the prosecut ion 's case to the kind of 
adversarial chal lenge necessary to insure the accused receives the 
effective assis tance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment. See Holland II , 876 P.2d. At 359-60. (quoting State v. 
Holland. 921P.2d. 430(Utahl 996). Strickland recognized that 
prejudice may be presumed when there has been actual or 
constructive denial of counsel, when the government has interfered 
with counse l ' s ass is tance, or when counsel has acted with a conflict 
of interest . See Str ickland. 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S. Ct. at 2067. State 
v. Arguel les . 921 P.2d. 439(Utah l996) . Both the United States 
Consti tut ion and the Utah Consti tution guarantee persons charged 
with a criminal offense the right of effective assistance of counsel to 
assist in their defense. See U.S. Constitution Amendment VI; U.S. 
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Consti tution Amendment XIV, section 7; Utah Constitution Article 
1, section 12; see also Strickland v. Washington, supra; State v. 
Templin. 805 P.2d. 182(1990). Mr,Loretto was denied his 
const i tut ionally guaranteed right to due process and equal 
protection, and therefor, the Trial Court ' s verdict must be reversed. 
Mr. Loretto has two(2) additional grounds for relief-section 78-
35a-107and section 78-35a-109. 
Section 78-35a-107(2): Mr. Loret to ' s claims are meritorious 
and merit the interests of just ice clause found in subsection (3) [that] 
if the court finds that the interests of just ice require, a court may 
excuse a pe t i t ioner ' s failure to file with in the time l imits . The recent 
decision in the Julien case indicates no limit, and even if it did, Mr. 
Loretto has complied with every procedural obstacle that has been 
placed in his way prior to a review of the merits of Loret to ' s peti t ion. 
Mr. Loretto requests appointment of counsel and is entitled to 
do so under section 78-35a-109(1) [which states] "if any portion of a 
petit ion is not summarily dismissed, the court may, upon the request 
of an indigent pet i t ioner appoint counsel on a pro bono basis. 
The following arguments support each of Mr. Loret to ' s 
content ions-none of which is speculative or conclusary. 
6 
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim can properly be 
raised for the first time via habeas corpus when the allegedly 
incompetent counsel handled the trial and the direct appeal. 
Fernondez v. Cook. 783 P2d. 547(Utah 19989). In Dunn v. Cook : "a 
pe t i t ioner ' s pro se petit ion for a writ of habeas corpus was 
improperly dismissed, where he alleged, in effect, that his prior 
direct appeal was a sham because of his counsel ' s ineffective 
representa t ion," Mr. Loretto respectfully submits this supplemental 
memorandum with the rightful intention of avoiding an improper 
dismissal . 
Habeas corpus is not to be used to review a final judgment 
arrived at through regular proceedings and due process of law by a 
court having jur i sd ic t ion , but is to be used to protect anyone who is 
restrained of his l iberty where there exists no jur isdic t ion or 
authori ty, or where the requirements of the law have been so ignored 
or distorted that the party is substantially and effectively denied 
what is included in the term due process of law, or where some other 
circumstance exists which would make it wholly unconscionable not 
to reexamine the conviction. Bryant v. Turner. 19 Utah 2d. 284, 431 
P.2d. 121(1967), overruled on other grounds, Dunn v. Cook. 791 P. 
7 
2d, 873(Utah l990) ; Gallegas v. Turner, 17 Utah 2d. 273, 409 P.2d. 
386(1965). This is foursquare with Mr. Lore t to ' s si tuation. Mr. 
Loretto argues in more detail the same issues raised by his appellate 
counsel as they were obviously preserved. Mr. Loretto, also adds 
several other issues and specifically requests the court to carefully 
scrutinize point 6-(i .e. Mr. Loretto was tried by a biased 
adjudicator) . His trial counsel and appellant counsel, as officers of 
the court would be reluctant to address this issue, however, as stated 
in Holland, "to be effective, attorney must play role of an advocate, 
rather than mere friend of [the] court ." U.S.C.A. Constitution 
Amendment 6. State v. Holland. 921 P.2d. 430(Utahl 996). Unless an 
attorney represents the interests of a client with zeal and loyalty, the 
adversarial system of jus t ice cannot operate. Holland IL The state of 
course must provide a trial before an impartial judge. Tumey v.Ohio. 
273 U.S. 510, 71L.Ed. 749, 47 S. Ct. 437(1927). This type of error 
defies harmless error analysis . See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 
27 5, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 124 L. Ed.2d. 182(1993); see also United State 
v. Wiles. 105 F. 3d. 1043(10TH Ci. 1996); Arizona v. Fulminante. 
499 U.S. 219, 113 L. Ed.2d. 302,111 S. Ct. 1246(1991); Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 17L. Ed.2d.750, 87 S. Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R. 3d. 
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1065(1967); see also Rose v. Clark. 478 U.S. 570, 92 L. Ed.2d. 460, 
106 S. Ct. 3101(1986). If Mr, Lore t to ' s argument in point 6 is correct 
and, he provides sufficient indicia of having been tried by a biased 
adjudicator then the whole trial will be rendered n unreliable vehicle 
for the determination of guilt or innocence. This type of error 
requires automatic reversal in spite of over whelming evidence of 
guilt . See United States v. Wiles. The evidence linking Mr. Loretto to 
this crime was at the very best, minimal . Mr. Lore t to ' s counsel was 
ineffective when this obvious issue was not briefed. 
The Tenth Circuit Court recognized in United States v. Cook. 
45F.3d. 388(10TH Cir.1995) that "an appellate advocate may deliver 
deficient performance and prejudice a defendant by omitting a "dead-
bang" winner, even though counsel may have presented strong but 
unsuccessful claims on appeal ." Id at 395, A' dead bang 
"Winner is an issue which was obvious from the trial record, and 
would have resulted in reversal on appeal ." ]£. If Mr. Loret to ' s 
argument in point 6 is correct, then-this is a text book case of 
structural error and ineffective assistance of counsel which does not 
comport with due process nor equal protection which is a violation of 
Mr. Lore t to ' s guaranteed Federal Consti tut ional pr ivi leges. 
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Point I. THE ENTIRE JURY PANEL WAS TAINTED BY A 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR'S STATEMENT DURING VOIR 
DIRE THAT APPELLANT'S HAIR AND CLOTHING 
STYLE WERE LIKE THOSE OF MEXICAN GANG 
MEMBERS. 
During voir dire, a prospective juror , Mrs. Bingham, gave 
unsolicited information regarding her son who had recently 
committed suicide. Mrs. Bingham told the court she was prejudiced 
by seeing a young man, and that she was " an emotional basket c a se / ' 
R. 211-212. When asked if she could concentrate on the evidence, 
Mrs. Bingham replied: 
" I 'm a very emotional person. We live next door to a Mexican. 
I 'm still up set at them in gangs and he-he dressed just like he did, I 
can ' t understand. Why can ' t he shave that thing off the back of his 
head? I 'm sorry, I don ' t know if I could be fair. (The jury(sic) was 
referring to the defendant at this point) . 
R. 21 1-23 2. Appel lant ' s brief at p .8 . Defense counsel moved to quash 
the panel, but agreed to question the panel about Mrs. Bingham's 
comments. R. 275. Brief of Appellant at 9. The court asked the panel 
if anyone felt "they were influenced by those comments of Mrs. 
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Bingham in a way tha t would make it d i f f icul t for them to fair and 
i m p a r t i a l , b a s e d upon her c o m m e n t s ? " 
R . 2 8 1 . A p p e l l a n t ' s b r i e f p.9 No one r e s p o n d e d . R. 2 8 1 . The cour t did 
not ask any a d d i t i o n a l q u e s t i o n s . R. 2 8 1 . The r ight to t r ia l by an 
impa r t i a l j u r y l ies at the very hear t o f d u e p r o c e s s . I rv in v. Dowd. 
3 66 U . S . 717 , 7 2 1 - 7 2 2 , 81 S. Ct. 163 9, 1641-1642 , 6L. 
E d . 2 d . 7 5 1 ( 1 9 6 1 ) . Smith v. P h i l l i p s , 1 0 2 S. Ct. 9 4 0 , 9 5 0 . "If a s ingle 
j u r o r is i m p r o p e r l y i n f luenced , ve rd i c t is an unfa i r as if all w e r e . " 
Stone v. Un i t ed S t a t e s . 113 F.2d. 270(6TH C i r . 1 9 4 0 ) . See also Uni ted 
S ta tes v. H e n d r i x . 549 F. 2d. 1225, 1227(9TH Cir . ) Cer t . Denied , 434 
U . S . 818 , 98 S. Ct. 5 8 , 5 4 L . Ed. 2d. 7 4 ( 1 9 7 7 ) . (quo t ing Uni ted Sta tes 
v. D e l a n e y . 732 F . 2d. 63 9 ( 1 9 8 4 ) . 
" [ 0 ] u r c o m m o n - l a w h e r i t a g e , our C o n s t i t u t i o n , and our 
e x p e r i e n c e in a p p l y i n g tha t C o n s t i t u t i o n have commi t t ed us 
i r r e v o c a b l y to the p o s i t i o n that the c r imina l t r ia l has one wel l -
def ined p u r p o s e - t o p r o v i d e a fair and r e l i ab l e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of gu i l t " 
Es tes v. T e x a s . 381 U . S . 532, 565 , 85 S. Ct. 1 628 , 1644, 14 L. Ed .2d . 
543 ( 1 9 6 5 ) . ( W a r r e n , C.J . , with whom Doug las and Go ldbe rg , J .J . , 
j o i n e d , c o n c u r r i n g ) . That pu rpose s imply can not be ach ieved if the 
j u r y ' s d e l i b e r a t i o n s are t a in ted by bias or p r e j u d i c e . Fa i rness and 
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rel iabi l i ty are assured only if the verdict is based on calm, reasoned 
evaluation of the evidence presented at r ial . Smith 102 S. Ct. 
950(1982). 
In Irvin v. Dowd. the court stated: 
"In essence, the right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally 
accused a fair trial by a panel of impart ial , "indifferent"' jurors . The 
failure to accord an accused a fair hearing violates the minimal 
standards of due process . In re Oliver, 3 3 3 U . S . 2 5 7 , 6 8 S . C t . 499, 92 
L. Ed. 682; Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 5 10, 47 S. Ct. 437, 7 1 L. Ed. 749. 
" A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process ." 
I n r e M u r c h i s o h . 349 U.S. 133, 1 36, 75 S. Ct. 623, 625, 99L. Ed. 942. 
In the ul t imate analysis , only the jury can strip a man of his liberty or 
life. In the language of Lord Coke, a juror must be as indifferent as he 
stands unsworn. Co. Litt . 155b. This is t rue, regardless of the 
heinousness of the crime charged, the apparent guilt of the offender 
or the station in life which he occupies ." 366 U.S. at 727, 81 S. Ct. at 
1642. After juror Bingham's inflammatory statement, how likely is 
it that other j u r o r s ' who harbored similar stereotypical 
preconceptions about Mexicans or "supposed" gang members would 
have openly voiced their bias amongst a group of strangers? 
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[Given] the human propensity for self-justif ication, it is very 
difficult u to learn from a ju ro r s ' own testimony after the verdict 
whether he was in fact impart ial ." Certainly, a juror is unlikely to 
admit that he had consciously plotted against the defendant during 
the course of the t r ial . Smith v. Phi l l ips . 102 S. Ct. 940 ,953(1982) . 
Since all jurors in Mr. Loret to 's matter remained silent there is no 
way of surmising with a certainty that the minds of some of the jurors 
was not contaminated by juror Bingham's comments. In fact, because 
of the additional focus and scrutiny of juror Bingham's statement, 
other l ike-minded individuals may have chosen to remain silent. The 
only certain way, to insure that the jury was not prejudiced, would 
have been to quash the panel as requested by Lore t to ' s defense 
counsel. Mr. Loretto rightfully asserted that he was not tried in a 
fundamentally fair fashion. 
POINT II: THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
ESTABLISH THAT LORETTO WAS A PARTY TO 
I H E OFFENSE. 
This court will reverse a criminal case for insufficient evidence 
only, when the evidence is "sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
13 
doubt that defendant committed the cr ime."Petree . 659 P. 2d. at 444; 
State v. Harmon. 767 P.2d. 567, 568(Utah Ct. App. 1989). The 
evidence is reviewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. 
Harmon 767 P.2d. at 568; Lsiree, 659 P.2d. at 444. The weight and 
credibility given to a wi tness ' s testimony is an exclusive function of 
the trier of fact. State v. Lamm. 606 P.2d. 229, 23 1 (Utah 1980). 
Despite this high standard, every element of the offense must be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The reviewing court will not 
make a "speculat ive leap" to fill gaps in the evidence in order to 
sustain the verdict . Petrre, 659 P.2d. at 444-45; State in re J.S.H.. 
642 P.2d. 386(Utahl982) ; State v. Kourbelas, 621 P.2d. 1238,1 240 
(Utah l980) . Brief of Appellant at 8-9. 
Since there was no evidence that Loretto was guilty as a party to 
the crime. There was not sufficient evidence to establish that Loretto 
was an accomplice to the robbery. Appellants brief 9. See 
Henderschott v. People. 653 P.2d. 3 85,390(Colo. 1982)(en banc) 
(stating that "in order to subject a person to criminal l iabili ty for a 
felony or serious misdemeanor, there must be a concurrence of 
unlawful act(actus reas) and a culpable mental state(mensrea) ") 
emphasis added), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 1225, 103 S. Ct.1232 
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(1983).In establ ishing the nexus between the intent and the act, 
"[t]he law can presume the intention so far as realized in the act, but 
not an intention beyond what was so real ized."State v. Castonguay, 
663 P.2d. 13 23(Utah l9 83)(quoting Thackerv . Commonwealth. 134 
Va, 7 67, 114 S. E.504, 5 05(1992). State v. Winward, 909 P.2d. 
909(Utah App. 199 5), Mr. Loretto was judged guilty for being at the 
scene of the crime. The brief of the appellee at p.24-27 makes a 
number of subjective interpretat ions , conclusory, selective 
observations and makes a "speculative leap" when stating, 
" Admittedly, defendant said nothing intel l igible to Ms. Flores, did 
not threaten her with a weapon, and did not take money from her him-
self." These are objective facts which indicate no culpable behavior 
by Loretto as stated by the assistant attorney general, prior to 
conjecturing in the next sentence, [that] "Never the less, the jury 
could reasonably conclude that the defendant aided the man with the 
knife ." It is jus t as reasonable that because of juror Bingham's prior 
comments about Mexicans and gangs, the jury drew inferences which 
did not exist-as no real evidence connected Mr. Loretto to the actual 
commission of the crime, other than being present. There was 
insufficient evidence to establish that Loretto was an accomplice to 
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the robbery. 
An accomplice is a person who knowingly, voluntari ly, and with 
common intent with the principle offender, unites in the commission 
of the crime. The cooperation in the crime must be real , not merely 
apparent. Mere presence combined with knowledge that a crime is 
about to be committed or a mental approbation while the will 
contributes nothing to the doing of the act, will not of itself 
constitute one an accomplice. State v. Fertig, 233 P.2d. 347,349, 
(Utah l951) . Appel lan t ' s brief p.17. Both Appellant and appellee 
make argument with respect to State v. Wood. 868 P.2d.70 
(Utahl993) . The case is dist inguishable and tangential to Mr. 
Loret to 's matter and was a waste of legal "sparr ing" because of 
irrelevance. 
It is quite possible that the ineffective representation of Mr. 
Loretto was because the State government prevented his counsel 
from fully and zealously representing Loretto because of loyalties 
owed to Third (3) par t ies(e .g . The Prosecution and The Utah 
Department of Correct ions) . See Holland II in point I supra. 
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POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT GAVE VERDICT URGING 
"ALLEN" INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY WHICH 
MISLED THEM AND CONSTITUTED A DIRECTED 
VERDICT FOR THE STATE. 
"Dynamite" instructions are grounds for reversal because of 
their strong coercive effect on the jury. Allen v. United States. 164 
U.S. 482, 41L. Ed. 528, 17S.Ct. 154(1896). A trial judge in a 
criminal case is prohibited from entering a judgment of conviction or 
directing the jury to come forward with such a verdict regardless of 
how over whelmingly the evidence may point in that direction; this 
rule stems from the Sixth Amendment 's command to afford jury trials 
in serious criminal cases; where the right is altogether denied, the 
state cannot contend that the deprivation was harmless error because 
the evidence established the defendants guilt; the error in such a case 
is that the wrong entity judged the defendant guil ty. Rose v. Clark. 
478 U.S. 570, 9 2 L . Ed.2d. 460, 105 S. Ct. 3110 . (1986) . As is 
constantly pointed out in both this brief and the previous brief of the 
appellants and appellee, the evidence linking Mr. Loretto to the 
crime was minimal, at best. The verdict rendered in this matter was a 
result of a mis guided jury that was exposed to extraneous evidence, 
17 
as well as erroneous verdict urging instructions. 
Generally, district court abuses its discretion when it bases its 
decision on erroneous view of law or clearly erroneous assessment of 
facts. United States v. Rahm.993 F.2d. 1403(9TH Cir .1993). 
Whether district cour t ' s instructions to jury misstated elements of 
statutory crime is reviewed de novo. United States v. Shabani, 993 
F.2d. l419(9TH Cir .1993). A new trial is warranted if, taken as a 
whole, jury instruct ions give misleading impression or inadequate 
understanding of law. Ball Banking Corp. v. U.P.G. Inc. . 985 F.2d. 
685(2ND Cir .1993). The manner in which the jury was instructed in 
Loret to ' s matter is at odds with the aforementioned case law. 
At the states request, the trial court gave the statutory 
definition of robbery to the jury in instruction 14 in addition to the 
elements instruct ion, number 15. R. 150-151,362-63 . The state was 
not entitled to have the jury instructed on the elements of robbery 
twice. In State v. Clayton . 646 P.2d. 723,725(Utahl 982). The court 
held that the defendant was not entitled to essentially two 
instructions on reasonable doubt because repeating the instruction 
had the effect of over emphasizing one point in the trial and was there 
for potent ial ly misleading. Similarly, in State v. McCumber. 622 
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P,2d. 3 5 3 , 3 5 9 ( U t a h l 9 8 0 ) . The cour t held that "a de fendan t is not 
e n t i t l e d to an i n s t r u c t i o n which is r e d u n d a n t or r e p e t i t i v e of 
p r i n c i p l e s e n u n c i a t e d in o ther i n s t r u c t i o n s g iven to the jury.5 5 
Jus t as the de fendan t is not en t i t l ed to r e p e t i t i o u s i n s t r u c t i o n s , 
the s ta te is l ike wise not en t i t l ed to r e p e t i t i o u s i n s t r u c t i o n s . 
R e p e t i t i o n of a j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n tends to p lace undue emphas i s on a 
p a r t i c u l a r po in t or undu ly h i g h l i g h t ce r t a in e v i d e n c e . Sta te v. 
W h i t e . 65 8 P .2d . 1 1 1 1 , 111 5(Mont . 1 9 83) . E m p h a s i z i n g one issue 
theo ry or de fense by r e p e t i t i o n has the added effect of min imiz ing the 
i m p o r t a n c e of o the r e v i d e n c e and i s s u e s . Whi te Auto S tores v .Reyes . 
223 F .2d . 2 9 8 , 3 0 5 ( 1 0 T H C i r . 1955) . 
A j u r y tha t r e c e i v e s a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y f lawed, bu rden - sh i f t i ng 
i n s t r u c t i o n on in t en t (of what c o n s t i t u t e s an a c c o m p l i c e ) i s , in effect , 
d i r ec t ed to r e t u r n a v e r d i c t aga ins t the de fendan t . Connec t i cu t v. 
J o h n s o n . 460 U . S . 3 7 , 9 5 , a n d n 3 , 7 4 L . Ed .2d . 823 ,103 S. 
C t . 9 6 9 ( 1 9 8 3 ) ( P o w e l l J. d i s s e n t i n g ) . " B e c a u s e a j u r y is the pr imary 
f inder of fact , a t r i a l j u d g e is p r o h i b i t e d from en te r ing j u d g m e n t of 
c o n v i c t i o n or d i r e c t i n g the j u r y to come forward with such a 
v e r d i c t . . . r e g a r d l e s s of how o v e r w h e l m i n g the ev idence may point 
in that d i r e c t i o n , " I b i d . , quo t ing Uni ted Sta tes v. Mar t in Linen 
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Supply Company. 430 U.S. 564, 572-573,51L. Ed.2d.642,97 S. Ct. 
1349(1977). The erroneous instruction invites the jury to abdicate 
its consti tut ional responsibil i ty to decide for i tself whether the 
state has proved every element of the offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt. It is likely the jury will accept this invitation because "there 
is no reason to believe the jury would have undertaken the more 
difficult task" of evaluating the evidence of intent, when offered 
the opportunity simply to rely on presumption. The ju ry ' s central 
obligation under Due Process Cause is to determine whether the 
state has proved each element of the offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Sandstram v. Montana. 442 U.S. 510.61L. Ed.2d. 39,99 S. 
Ct. 2450(1979); Connecticut v. Johnson.460U.S. at 85,74L. 
Ed.2d.823,103 S. Ct. 969(plurali ty opinion). When a defendant 
[questions] the issue of intent, a reviewing court will rarely be 
capable of deciding whether the error contributed to the verdict; it 
will have no way of knowing how the jury treated the question of 
intent. See Sandstram. 442U.S. . at 526.61L. Ed.2d.39, 99S. Ct. 
2450; Court of Ulster County v. Allen. 442 U.S. at 175-
176,60L.Ed.2d. 777, 99S. Ct.2213(Powell J., dissent ing) . 
"[A]n erroneous presumption on a disputed element of the crime 
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r e n d e r s i r r e l e v a n t the ex idence on the i s sue because the j u r y may 
have r e l i ed upon the p r e s u m p t i o n r a the r than upon the ev idence . 
" C o n n e c t i c u t v. J o h n s o n . 4 6 0 I J . S . a t 8 5 . 7 4 L . E d . 2 d . 8 2 3 . 103S. Ct. 
9 6 9 ( p l u r a l i t y o p i n i o n ) . The o rd inary view is tha t a j u r y adheres to 
the i n s t r u c t i o n s , Pa rke r v . R a n d o l p h . 442 U .S . 62, 7 3 , 60 L. Ed.2d, 
7 1 3 , 99 S. Ct. 2132 (9179) (p lu ra l i t y o p i n i o n ) , and there is no 
reason to b e l i e v e tha t the " lay j u ry wil l know enough to d i s r ega rd 
the j u d g e ' s bad law if in fact he mi sgu ides t h e m . " Bo l l enbach v. 
Un i t ed S t a t e s . 3 2 6 U . S . 6 0 7 . 6 1 3-614.9QL. E d . 3 5 0 , 6 6 S . Ct. 
4 0 2 ( 1 9 4 6 ) . Rose v. ClarkT 4 7 8 U . S . 5 7 0 , 9 2 L . E d . 2 d . 4 6 0 , 1 0 6 S . 
Ct-3 1 0 1 . Th i s a r g u m e n t when cons ide red a long wi th L o r e t t o ' s 
a rgumen t s on d i r ec t appea l c lea r ly shows Lore t to was denied a 
fair t r i a l . 
POINT IV: THE COURT REFUSED A R E A S O N A B L E 
A L T E R N A T I V E I N S T R U C T I O N - T H E R E BY, 
P R E V E N T I N G LORETTO FROM PRESENTING HIS 
D E F E N S I V E THEORY OF THE CASE. 
As a p r e l i m i n a r y mat te r it should be noted t h a t " [A] l i t i gan t 
is en t i t l ed to have the j u r y in s t ruc t ed as to his c la ims and 
theo r i e s of law if suppor t ed by the ev idence and b rough t to the 
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attention of the court . . . It does not matter that the evidence was 
minimal or was presented in a piece meal fashion. All that is 
necessary is that there be some evidence supporting a party 's 
theory of the case. Carvel Corp. v. Diversified Management Group 
Lnc^ 930F.2d.228(2ND Cir.1991). Ball Banking Corp. v. UPG Inc.. 
985F.2d.685(2ND Cir .1993). In United States v. Hunt, it was 
determined that a "Trial judge ' s refusal to deliver requested 
instruction consti tutes reversible error only if instruction is 
substantial ly correct , and is not covered in charge actually 
given to the jury, and it concerns important point in the trial so 
that failure to give it seriously impairs defendant 's ability to 
present a given defense effectively. 794F.2d. 1095(5TH Cir, 1986). 
This is four square with the fashion in which Mr. Loretto was 
tried and does not comport with Due Process. In reviewing jury 
instructions , appellate court must consider all that jury heard 
and, from the standpoint of the jury decide not whether the 
charge was faultless in every particular, but whether the jury was 
misled in any way and whether it had understanding of those 
issues and its duty to determine those issues; the reviewing court 
must look at the jury instructions as a whole to determine 
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whether when, taken together, they properly state the [governing 
law.] 
Robinson v. Audi NSU Auto Union : 73 9F.2d. 1 48 1 ( 1 9 84). 
One of the rightful boasts of western civil ization is that the 
state has the [sole] burden of establishing guilt solely on the 
basis of evidence produced in court and assuring an accused all 
the safe guards of a fair procedure. These rudimentary conditions 
for determining guilt are inevitably wanting if the jury which is 
to sit in judgment on a fellow human being comes to its task 
with its mind eradicably poisoned against him. Patton v. Vount. 
104S. Ct .2884,2900(1984) . 
Mr. Loretto submits this argument along with the argument 
submitted on direct appeal in support of his posit ion. 
POINT V: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO GRANT 
THE APPELLANT A CONTINUANCE SO COUNSEL 
COULD ADEQUATELY INVESTIGATE THE CASE BY 
INTERVIEWING A POTENTIAL DEFENSE WITNESS. 
Mr.Loret to stands on the argument presented in his direct 
appeal. 
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POINT VI: MR. LORETTO WAS NOT TRIED BY AN 
IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL, BOTH THE COURT AND 
JURY LACKED IMPARTIALITY. 
The previous five points support Loret to ' s position that he 
was not afforded a fair tr ial . Point 1. The entire jury panel was 
tainted by a prospective ju ror ' s statement during voir dire that 
Appel lant ' s hair and clothing style were like those of Mexican 
gang member. Point 2: There was insufficient evidence to 
establish that Loretto was a party to the offense as pointed out 
by both the assistant attorney general and Loret to ' s appellate 
counsel, supra. Point 3: The trial court gave verdict urging 
"Alien" instructions to the jury which misled them and 
constituted a directed verdict for the state. "A trial judge in 
criminal case is prohibited from entering a judgment of 
conviction or directing the jury to come forward with such a 
verdict regardless of how overwhelming the evidence may point 
in that direct ion. Rose v. Clark. 478U.S. 570.92L. Ed.2d. 460, 
106S.Ct . 3101(1986). Po in t4 : The court refused a reasonable 
al ternative instruct ion-there by , preventing Loretto from 
presenting his defensive theory. This act was fundamentally 
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unfair, when considered with the coercive instructions allowed on 
behalf of the state, insured conviction of Mr. Loretto, not with 
standing the minimal evidence of culpabil i ty. Point 5: The trial 
court erred by refusing to grant a continuance so counsel could 
adequately invest igate the case by interviewing a Potential 
Defense Witness. The court ' s actions obviously favored the state 
and rendered Mr. Loretto 's defense a mockery and sham. Point 6: 
Mr. Loretto was not tried by an impartial tr ibunal-both court and 
jury lacked impart ia l i ty . The state [must, of course] provide a 
trial before an impartial judge. Tumey. This has not been done 
in Mr. Lore t to ' s matter. "When a t r i a l judge is discovered to 
have some basis for rendering a biased judgement, his actual 
motivations are hidden from review, and the [U.S.] Supreme 
Court must presume that process was impaired. Vasquez v. 
Hil lery, 106 S. Ct. 617 (1986). 
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Wherefore, I, Gilbert Loretto respectfully request the court 
to grant my peti t ion for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of this 
supplemental memorandum of points and authorit ies to the Utah 
Supreme Court and the Utah Attorney General this / day 
of UU/,J 1999. 
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